Philosophy / 19th century to today
Ordinary language philosophy
Philosophers who looked to everyday speech to dissolve and solve philosophical puzzles
- Began
- Roots in the 1930s and 1940s; the Oxford movement flourished from the late 1940sScholars: Its roots are usually traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein's later thinking of the 1930s and 1940s. The Oxford group was most active from the late 1940s to the 1960s. The tree ends it around AD 1975, but historians generally say it lost its place as a leading, self-conscious movement in these years, while its methods and questions continued in later analytic philosophy.
- Where
- Oxford, England, was the main centre. Cambridge, where Wittgenstein taught, was also important, and related work was done in the United States
- Key figures
- No single founder. Key figures were Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson and, as a major influence, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Key works
- The Concept of Mind; Philosophical Investigations; How to Do Things with Words; Sense and Sensibilia; Individuals
At a glance
Ordinary language philosophy was a way of doing philosophy that paid close attention to how people really use words in daily life. Many of its followers held that some philosophical problems arise when thinkers stretch words such as "know", "see" or "mean" beyond their normal jobs. By checking how those words work in ordinary speech, they hoped to clear up the confusion.
The approach grew out of analytic philosophy and was shaped by the later work of Wittgenstein. It flourished at Oxford from the late 1940s, where Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin were leading figures. It was never a formal school with a creed, and some of its best-known members rejected the label.
What made it distinctive was its method more than any single doctrine. Its philosophers looked closely at small differences between words and at what people do when they speak. As a leading movement it faded from about the 1960s and 1970s. Its methods and debates went on within later analytic philosophy.
Key concepts
- Ordinary language
- The everyday words and phrases people use in normal life, as opposed to special technical vocabularies.
- Use
- The idea, linked to Wittgenstein, that the meaning of a word is closely tied to how it is used in practice.
- Category mistake
- Ryle's term for treating something as belonging to one logical kind when it belongs to another.
- Speech act
- An action performed by saying something, such as promising, warning or naming.
- Performative utterance
- Austin's term for a sentence that does something rather than only describing, as in "I promise".
- Language-game
- Wittgenstein's term for a stretch of language woven into a particular human activity.
Core ideas
- Many of its philosophers thought that some philosophical problems come from misusing words, though they differed on how many.
- A common method was to understand a concept by looking at how its word is used in ordinary situations.
- Many held that everyday language contains distinctions speakers have found useful, and that these deserve attention before they are set aside.
- Philosophers of this kind often urged careful description before the building of grand theories.
- Austin and others stressed that speaking is a form of action, so language should be studied in the contexts where it is used.
- Puzzles were often treated as something to be dissolved by showing how a word had been taken out of its normal setting.
Key arguments
The ghost in the machine
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle argued that picturing the mind as a hidden inner object behind the body, as in Descartes's view, rests on a category mistake. He analysed many mental concepts in terms of abilities, dispositions and ways of acting and thinking, not as private inner happenings.
Saying is doing
Austin noted that saying "I promise" or "I name this ship" does not report anything. It performs an act. He used this to show that language has many jobs besides stating facts.
Fine distinctions in excuses
In his paper "A Plea for Excuses", Austin argued that the many words we use to excuse actions, such as "accidentally", "inadvertently" and "by mistake", mark real differences. Studying them could teach philosophers about action and responsibility.
Against sense-data
In Sense and Sensibilia, Austin criticised the view that we directly perceive only private mental items called sense-data. He argued that its supporters blurred the differences between words like "see", "seem" and "look", and drew on a narrow range of examples.
Philosophers
- Gilbert Ryle 1900–1976Oxford professor who wrote The Concept of Mind and edited the journal Mind.
- J. L. Austin 1911–1960Oxford philosopher who developed the study of speech acts and performatives.
- P. F. Strawson 1919–2006Oxford philosopher whose work on reference and on persons drew on ordinary ways of speaking, though he also built broader theories.
- Ludwig Wittgenstein 1889–1951Cambridge philosopher whose later work on meaning as use was a main inspiration.
- Norman Malcolm 1911–1990American philosopher and student of Wittgenstein who used ordinary language arguments, for example about knowledge and doubt.
Main criticisms
Is it too narrow and trivial?
Critics said that studying how words are used left out the large questions of philosophy and amounted to dictionary work. Defenders replied that careful attention to language was a serious way of reaching those questions and of avoiding errors.
Does ordinary usage settle anything?
Critics such as Ernest Gellner argued that everyday speech may carry mistaken assumptions, and that science and theory can rightly revise it. Defenders answered that ordinary usage is a starting point and a check, not an unchangeable authority.
Is the method clear enough?
Some asked how one decides what "we" would say, since speakers differ. Defenders said that the differences could be studied, and that the method needed careful observation, not a single fixed rule.
Formal methods or ordinary speech?
Philosophers who favoured formal logic and constructed languages, with varied aims, held that such tools bring precision and clarity to philosophical problems. Ordinary language thinkers replied that formal systems can leave out many of the roles words play in life. The disagreement was largely about method, and many philosophers used both approaches.
Sources
- Baz, Avner. "Ordinary Language Philosophy." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.Overview of the movement, its methods and its critics.
- Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949.Classic statement of the category mistake argument.
- Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.Austin's William James Lectures on speech acts, published after his death.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.The main source of the idea that meaning lies in use.
- Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.Places Oxford philosophy within the wider history of the analytic tradition.