Philosophy / Islamic and medieval European

Nominalism

A family of medieval views that deny that universals exist as things apart from individuals and the mind

Began
Debated. Positions later called nominalist appear in the 11th and 12th centuries, and the best-known form comes with William of Ockham in the 14th centuryScholars: Historians debate how far 11th and 12th century thinkers such as Roscelin of Compiègne and, in some readings, Peter Abelard can be called nominalists. Many treat them as precursors. The fully developed school is usually linked to the 14th century.
Where
Western Europe, especially Oxford and Paris
Key figures
No single founder. William of Ockham is the best-known figure.
Key works
Summa Logicae (Ockham); Ordinatio (Ockham's commentary on the Sentences); Quodlibetal Questions (Ockham); Isagoge (Porphyry, which posed the questions about universals that medieval writers took up)

At a glance

Nominalism is a label for a family of medieval views about universals. Universals are general features such as "humanity" or "redness" that many things seem to share. Nominalists deny that these exist as separate realities apart from individual things. They differ over what general terms do instead. Some stress words, and others stress concepts in the mind.

The question comes from the problem of universals. Porphyry raised it in his Isagoge, an introduction to Aristotle's Categories. Boethius and many later commentators then shaped the debate over centuries. Some earlier thinkers took positions later called nominalist. Most historians link the best-developed form to William of Ockham in the 14th century.

The label is mainly used for Western medieval debates, although Islamic philosophers also discussed universals. Scholasticism, the method of teaching in medieval schools, was not one uniform school, and nominalists were one group within it. Ockham tried to explain knowledge and language while assuming as few kinds of things as possible. Many nominalist thinkers also stressed God's freedom, but this is a theme of Ockham and related theologians, not a defining mark of all nominalism.

Key concepts

Universals
General features such as "whiteness" or "being a horse" that many different things seem to share.
Particulars
Individual things, such as this one horse or that one white wall.
Realism
The rival view that universals exist in some real way, either in things or apart from them.
Term
For Ockham, a sign that can be spoken, written or mental, which logicians study through what it signifies and how it stands for things in a sentence.
Mental concept
In Ockham's view, a natural sign in the mind that signifies many individual things, and which is itself an individual act of mind.
Parsimony
The principle that one should not assume more kinds of things than are needed to explain something.

Core ideas

  • Nominalists deny that universals are things existing apart from individuals.
  • On Ockham's account, what is general is a sign, whether spoken, written or mental, that applies to many individuals. Other nominalists give different accounts.
  • Nominalists still need to say why things are rightly grouped together. Many appeal to the individuals themselves and their likeness, though they differ on how to explain this.
  • Explanations should avoid adding entities that are not needed.
  • Ockham held that the mind can know individual things directly, which he called intuitive cognition. He distinguished it from abstractive cognition, which does not depend on the thing being present.
  • Some late medieval nominalist theologians stressed God's power. They distinguished what God could do absolutely from what God has ordained, and this was a theological thesis added to their logic.

Key arguments

The razor

Later writers summed up a method often used by Ockham as "do not multiply entities without necessity." If a thing can be explained without positing a further entity, then the further entity is not needed.

Terms that stand for things

In the Summa Logicae, Ockham argues that the word "man" works by standing for individual men. It does not point to one shared "humanity" that exists on its own.

Likeness without a shared essence

Socrates and Plato are alike, but Ockham says we need not suppose a third thing, humanity, in both. Each is an individual of the kind that the concept "human" applies to.

Knowing individuals directly

Ockham held that the mind can know a particular thing directly through intuitive cognition. He also described abstractive cognition, and he held that general concepts arise from experience of individuals.

Philosophers

  • William of Ockham c. 1287–1347English Franciscan friar whose logic and theology gave nominalism its best-known form.
  • Roscelin of Compiègne c. 1050–c. 1125Early medieval thinker often described as an early nominalist, though little of his writing survives.
  • Peter Abelard 1079–1142French philosopher who rejected realist accounts of universals and stressed words, concepts and meaning, a view often compared with nominalism.
  • Jean Buridan c. 1300–c. 1360Parisian philosopher often associated with the via moderna, or nominalist tradition, though historians debate that label.
  • Gabriel Biel c. 1420–1495German theologian who passed late medieval nominalist thought to the era of the Reformation.

Main criticisms

Does it explain similarity?

Realists offer their own accounts of why things are alike and why one word can be true of many things, and they argue that shared natures do this work best. Nominalists reply that likeness among individuals is enough and that extra universals raise further questions. Critics answer that likeness itself then needs analysis, and nominalists differ on how to give it.

Is knowledge of kinds secure?

Critics argue that if there are no real common natures, science and definitions lose their footing. Defenders answer that concepts formed from experience of individuals can still support reliable knowledge.

Effects on theology

Some scholars argue that nominalism's stress on divine freedom weakened confidence in a rational natural order. Others say this picture is overdrawn, and that historians still debate how far Ockham and his followers changed theology.

Is the label useful?

Some historians say "nominalism" covers too many different positions to be one school. Others reply that thinkers did share the denial of real universals, and that the term is still helpful when used carefully.

Sources

  1. Spade, Paul Vincent, and Claude Panaccio. "William of Ockham." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.Overview of Ockham's logic, metaphysics and theology.
  2. Klima, Gyula. "The Medieval Problem of Universals." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.The background debate between realists and nominalists.
  3. Adams, Marilyn McCord. William Ockham. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.A detailed two-volume study of Ockham's thought.
  4. Spade, Paul Vincent, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.Essays on his logic, knowledge, ethics and politics.