Philosophy / 19th century to today
Logical positivism
The Vienna Circle's view that factual claims must be testable by experience, apart from truths of logic
- Began
- 1920s, with the Vienna Circle (the group met regularly from about 1924)Scholars: Dates are conventional and approximate. Historians often mark the Circle's public launch with its 1929 manifesto. The Vienna group dissolved in the 1930s amid political pressure and emigration, while related work, often called logical empiricism, continued in Britain, the United States and elsewhere into the 1940s and 1950s. The tree's end date of about 1960 reflects its fading as a distinct school
- Where
- Vienna, Austria, with a linked group in Berlin; later Britain, the United States and Scandinavia
- Key figures
- No single founder. Moritz Schlick gathered the Vienna Circle; Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Hans Hahn were leading members
- Key works
- The Logical Structure of the World; Language, Truth and Logic; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (a major influence); The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle; Logical Syntax of Language
At a glance
Logical positivism was a school of philosophy that began in Vienna in the 1920s. Its members were mostly scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. They wanted philosophy to be as clear and careful as good science.
Their main idea was about meaning. Members held that a statement about the world is meaningful only if experience can bear on it in some way, while the truths of logic and mathematics are a separate case. Members disagreed about how to state this. Early versions spoke of verification. Later ones spoke of confirmation or testability. Many claims in traditional metaphysics were judged, under these criteria, to lack factual meaning.
The Vienna Circle dissolved in the 1930s. Political repression in Austria, the murder of Schlick in 1936 and the Nazi annexation of 1938 all played a part, and members left at different times, several of them Jewish or on the political left. Their ideas continued as logical empiricism in Britain and the United States, where they shaped analytic philosophy. By about 1960 few philosophers still called themselves logical positivists.
Key concepts
- Verification principle
- The idea, in several versions, that a statement has factual meaning only if experience could in some way count for or against it.
- Analytic and synthetic statements
- Analytic statements, such as 'all bachelors are unmarried', were treated as true in virtue of meaning and logic, while synthetic statements make claims about the world; members differed on how to ground this distinction.
- Metaphysics
- The branch of philosophy that asks about the ultimate nature of reality; the positivists argued that purportedly metaphysical assertions lacked factual meaning under their criteria.
- Protocol sentences
- Sentences meant to record basic observations that could serve as a base for testing other claims; their exact form and status were disputed within the Circle.
- Unity of science
- The hope that the sciences could be connected into a coherent whole; members, especially physicalists and their more pluralist colleagues, debated how far this required reduction or a common language.
- Emotivism
- A view, set out by A. J. Ayer, that moral statements express feelings or attitudes rather than describe facts.
Core ideas
- Factual claims about the world must answer to observation and experience in some way.
- Logic and mathematics were treated as a separate case, not as reports of observed facts.
- A claim that nothing in experience could bear on, and that is not a truth of logic, was held to lack factual meaning.
- Many traditional disputes in metaphysics were seen as confusions about language, not real questions.
- Philosophy's job is to clarify the concepts and statements of science, not to build grand systems.
- Many members hoped the sciences could be seen as one connected enterprise.
Key arguments
The verification test
An early form of the test asked what observations would count for or against a sentence. If none could, the sentence was said to have no factual meaning. Authors varied in how strictly they stated this and in how they applied it to metaphysics. Later writers moved to weaker ideas such as confirmation and testability.
Logic and mathematics as non-factual
Positivists wanted to explain why '2 + 2 = 4' is certain without saying it describes a hidden realm. Many, following Wittgenstein or Carnap, said such truths hold in virtue of meaning or linguistic rules. Members did not all accept the same account.
Ethics as expression
Ayer argued that 'Stealing is wrong' does not state a checkable fact. It is more like expressing disapproval, which is why moral disputes cannot be settled by observation in the same way as scientific ones.
Rational reconstruction
Carnap tried to show how scientific concepts could be built step by step from basic experience using logic. The aim was to make the grounds of scientific knowledge clear and open to inspection.
Philosophers
- Moritz Schlick 1882–1936Physicist-turned-philosopher who led the Vienna Circle until he was shot dead by a former student at the University of Vienna.
- Rudolf Carnap 1891–1970A leading member of the Circle, who worked on logic, language and the structure of scientific knowledge.
- Otto Neurath 1882–1945Social scientist and philosopher who championed the unity of science and a shared scientific language.
- Hans Hahn 1879–1934Mathematician who helped found the Circle and promoted modern logic.
- A. J. Ayer 1910–1989British philosopher who brought the movement's ideas to English readers in Language, Truth and Logic (1936).
- Hans Reichenbach 1891–1953Leader of the related Berlin group, who worked on probability and the philosophy of physics.
Main criticisms
The principle undermines itself
Critics asked whether the verification principle can itself be verified. It is neither a logical truth nor an observation report. Responses differed: some members treated it as a proposal or explication of what counts as meaningful, others as a methodological rule, and many revised it over time.
Observation is shaped by theory
W. V. O. Quine and others argued that statements are tested not one by one against raw experience, but as part of whole networks of belief. Some later logical empiricists accepted looser forms of testing, while others held that a clearer account of observation could still be given.
The analytic and synthetic line is blurry
Quine's 1951 essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argued that no clear line can be drawn between truths of meaning and truths of fact. Carnap held that the distinction can be drawn within precisely specified language frameworks, and the disagreement between the two remained substantial.
Science does not work this way
Karl Popper, an influential critic who moved in the same Viennese intellectual world but was not a member of the Circle, said science advances by testing theories and trying to refute them, with surviving theories counted as corroborated rather than verified. Later writers such as Thomas Kuhn stressed the role of shifting frameworks. Defenders noted that members themselves revised their criteria in response to such points.
Sources
- Uebel, Thomas. "Vienna Circle." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.Detailed account of the Circle's members and ideas.
- Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz, 1936.The clearest English statement of the view.
- Friedman, Michael. Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.Scholarly essays on the movement's origins and philosophy.
- Carnap, Rudolf. The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.English translation of Carnap's 1928 Aufbau.