Philosophy / Indian
Madhyamaka
The Middle Way school that teaches all things are empty of independent, self-standing existence
- Began
- Traditionally traced to Nagarjuna, 2nd century AD, and developed by later commentatorsScholars: Most historians place Nagarjuna c. 150 to 250 AD, in southern India. Details of his life are debated, and some works traditionally credited to him may be by later authors. Madhyamaka took shape as a school over the following centuries.
- Where
- India, later spreading to Tibet, China, Mongolia, Korea, Japan and Vietnam
- Key figures
- No single founder. Nagarjuna is the principal early figure, and later thinkers such as Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Bhaviveka and Candrakirti are seen as his successors and interpreters
- Key works
- Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika); Seventy Verses on Emptiness; Refutation of Objections (Vigrahavyavartani); Four Hundred Verses (Aryadeva); Entering the Middle Way (Candrakirti)
At a glance
Madhyamaka means the Middle Way school. It is a branch of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. Its central claim is that nothing has svabhava, or inherent nature. Things exist, but only in dependence on other things, such as causes and parts.
The school is traditionally traced to Nagarjuna, an Indian Buddhist thinker of the 2nd century AD. He presented his ideas as a careful reading of the Buddha's teaching on dependent origination. Followers hold that he was explaining what the Buddha meant, not adding something new. Later Indian commentators developed different styles of Madhyamaka, and the school became very influential in Tibetan Buddhism and East Asian Buddhism.
What marks Madhyamaka is its use of reasoning to show that fixed, independent essences cannot be found. It describes two levels of truth. In everyday life, things work and can be talked about. At the deepest level, they are empty of own-being. Some traditions, especially influential Tibetan ones, also say that things depend on the concepts and names we apply to them, though interpreters differ on this. Followers say the view avoids two extremes, the claim that things exist absolutely and the claim that nothing exists at all.
Key concepts
- Sunyata (emptiness)
- The fact that things lack inherent, independent existence, because they depend on causes, parts and other conditions.
- Svabhava (inherent nature)
- A fixed, self-standing essence that things would have if they existed independently, which Madhyamaka denies.
- Pratityasamutpada (dependent origination)
- The Buddhist teaching that things come about and exist in dependence on conditions, which Madhyamaka thinkers analyse in several kinds of dependence, such as on causes, on parts and on concepts.
- Two truths
- The distinction between conventional truth, how things appear and function in daily life, and ultimate truth, their emptiness.
- Madhyama pratipad (the Middle Way)
- A path between the extremes of eternalism, that things exist inherently, and nihilism, that nothing exists.
- Prasangika and Svatantrika
- Labels, used mainly in Tibetan and later scholarly classification, for two approaches to Madhyamaka argument, which differ over whether the school should put forward arguments of its own.
Core ideas
- Nothing has inherent existence, since everything depends on conditions such as causes and parts.
- Emptiness is not nothingness. It is the way things exist, as dependent and interconnected.
- Emptiness is itself empty, so it must not be treated as an ultimate thing.
- The two truths are distinct but not separate, and ordinary life and moral action remain meaningful.
- Clinging to fixed views, including views about emptiness, causes suffering.
- Understanding emptiness through reasoning and meditation is a path toward liberation.
Key arguments
Analysis of motion
Nagarjuna asks where motion could occur. It cannot happen in the place already traversed or the place not yet reached, and a mover cannot be found apart from the movement. He concludes that motion, as an inherent thing, is not coherent, though people still walk conventionally.
The tetralemma
Madhyamaka often examines four options: a thing exists, does not exist, both, or neither. By showing that none holds as an inherent claim, it aims to free the mind from fixed views.
Emptiness and dependent origination
Nagarjuna says whatever is dependently arisen is empty. If things had fixed natures they could not change or depend on causes, so emptiness is what makes change and the Buddhist path possible.
Analysis of the self
Candrakirti uses the image of a chariot. It is not its wheels, its axle or any single part, nor something apart from them, yet we use the word. The self is treated in the same way.
Philosophers
- Nagarjuna c. 150 to 250 ADIndian Buddhist thinker traditionally regarded as the founder of Madhyamaka.
- Aryadeva c. 3rd century ADNagarjuna's main follower, who extended his arguments in the Four Hundred Verses.
- Buddhapalita c. 470 to 540 ADCommentator whose approach became associated with the Prasangika style.
- Bhaviveka c. 500 to 570 ADCommentator who argued for independent arguments, associated with the Svatantrika style.
- Candrakirti c. 600 to 650 ADDefender of the Prasangika approach, highly influential in Tibetan Buddhism.
- Tsongkhapa 1357 to 1419Tibetan scholar whose commentaries shaped the Gelug school's reading of Madhyamaka.
Main criticisms
Does emptiness amount to nihilism?
Critics, including other Buddhist and Indian schools, said that denying inherent nature destroys causation, ethics and the Buddhist path. Madhyamaka replies that the opposite is true: only things lacking fixed natures can change, cause effects and be transformed.
Is Madhyamaka self-refuting?
Opponents argued that if all things are empty, then the claim of emptiness and the arguments for it are empty too, and so cannot establish anything. A widely influential reading says Nagarjuna replies that he holds no thesis about inherent nature, and that empty arguments can still work, just as an illusory person can stop another illusory person. Scholars debate what this reply means and whether it is fully consistent.
Can an ultimate truth be spoken of?
Some critics said that if ultimate reality is beyond concepts, the school cannot coherently teach it. Defenders say language is a conventional tool, used as a raft to be set aside, which can still guide people toward insight.
Yogacara objections
Some Yogacara thinkers, a diverse school, gave consciousness a more real status than Madhyamaka allowed, and worried that Madhyamaka denied too much. Madhyamikas respond that even mind is dependently arisen, so granting it inherent existence repeats the error. Modern scholars note that the two traditions held varied positions and that some of the sharp contrast comes from later classifications.
Sources
- Westerhoff, Jan. "Nagarjuna." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta.Overview of Nagarjuna's life and arguments.
- Garfield, Jay L. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.Translation and commentary on Nagarjuna's main work.
- Siderits, Mark. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007.Accessible introduction including Madhyamaka.
- Westerhoff, Jan. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.Philosophical study of Nagarjuna's arguments.